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ABSTRACT 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has a global character. As globalization grows, 
foreign direct investment grows. This research analyses the relationship between foreign 
direct investment and developing countries. The main contributors to foreign direct 
investment are multinational corporations and this research will show the impact of this 
kind of investment on the economy of developing countries. The research will show the 
way the developing countries try to benefit from FDI in order to complement their 
economic growth. This thesis will analyze the incentives and regulations the developing 
countries use to attract FDI and what needs to be done to make this type of investment 
beneficial for developing world. The thesis concludes that countries can not rely only on 
FDI as a panacea for treating economic and social problems. The governments should 
regulate FDI accordingly to benefit the economy and people. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     To write about foreign direct investment, it is necessary to mention the global 
character of this process: “As globalization continues, foreign direct investment, 
including investment in developing economies, continues to grow each year."1 
In this research, we will pay attention to FDI and developing countries. For the 
developing countries, FDI may play an important role since FDI is a potential engine for 
development, “as the foreigner employs and trains local personnel, indirectly encourages 
secondary service providers and producers of goods, pays taxes, and-in some case-leaves 
behind valuable know-how.”2 The flow of FDI to developing countries continues to grow 
year after year.3 In the second half of 1990s FDI flow increased from Western Europe 
and the United States to developing countries “peaking at US $ 1.3 trillion in 2001.”4   
     The main contributors to FDI are multinational enterprises (MNEs). It is now widely 
recognized that the multinational enterprise can play an important role in the 
industrialization of different countries.5 Generally, the MNEs contribute toward the 
industrialization of a country through foreign direct investment.6 In this research, we will 
explore why the developing countries are so interested in FDI and prefer this type of 
                                                 
1 NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, XXIII (2005). 
2 Id. at XXVIII. 
3 Id. at XXXI. 
4 Id. at XXXI. 
5 Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives to Tax 
Incentive Policies, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 208, 209 (1985). 
6 Id.  
  
2
investment to the usual financial loans from international institutions, which also allow 
a country to develop its economy. Probably one of the answers would look like this: “The 
sharp decrease in net commercial bank loans to developing countries in the 80’s, from a 
peak of $44.4 billion in 1981 to a low of negative $4.1 billion in 1990, brought about 
renewed interest in other sources of private investment capital, including foreign direct 
investment.”7 
     For a discussion of this thesis, it is important to establish the meaning of FDI. The 
shortest definition is: “Foreign Direct Investment – overseas investment by multinational 
enterprises.”8 This does not, however, explain how MNEs make this investment. Is it just 
a financial investment given to a country by a private party under certain conditions? 
Who is the beneficiary of this investment? Is there a government that receives a loan or a 
private party that manages to look attractive to foreign investors and at the same time 
trustworthy enough to get an investment? A more detailed explanation would look like 
this: 
     Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one economy (“direct investor”) in an entity 
resident in an economy other than that of the investor (“direct investment 
enterprise”). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant 
degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. Direct 
investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities 
and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated 
enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.9 
 
                                                 
7 IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1 (1993) 
8 Glossary available at http://www.bized.ac.uk/virtual/dc/resource/glos3.htm (last visited on February 
22nd, 2006) 
9 OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, THIRD EDITION, 3 (1996) 
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 An investor may be “an individual, or incorporated public or private enterprise, a 
government, or a group of related individuals.”10. 
     During the Earth Summit11 in 1992, it was estimated that between 1993 and 2000 the 
developing world would need $600 billion annually to achieve sustainable development 
and it was asserted that governments alone would not be able to meet that goal.12 In this 
situation, “FDI can indeed play a role in the economic growth of debt-burdened Third 
World nations.”13 
     This research will demonstrate the impact of FDI on different countries, but the main 
focus will be on Mexico and the Republic of Kazakhstan, including analysis of the 
domestic policy of both countries towards foreign direct investment.  
     Mexico and Kazakhstan were chosen due to the relative similarity of their legal 
systems; both countries are civil law countries. Also Mexico and Kazakhstan have similar 
attitudes toward foreign influence which similarly affected the history of their economic 
development. The Republic of Kazakhstan was a part of the USSR and thus was closed to 
direct contacts with other countries, which in part explains the plethora of laws, decrees 
and regulations concerning foreign investments and adopted during the short history of 
modern Kazakhstan. The history of economic development in Mexico and other countries 
in Central and South America reflects those countries’ feeling of distrust towards their 
powerful northern neighbor: “The 1960s and 1970s were periods during which foreign 
                                                 
10 Id.  
11 The Earth Summit was an International conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to discuss issues 
concerning climate change, world poverty, environment and development, the worlds forest and 
biodiversity. 
12 Sophie Hsia, Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment: Are Voluntary Codes of Conduct and Self-
Imposed Standards Enough? 9 ENVTL. LAW. 673, 675 (2003). 
13 CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE AND CONTRIBUTORS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 1990s, ix (1990). 
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investment and multinational corporations were considered threats to national 
sovereignty and economic development.”14  Kazakhstan has a very long border with the 
Russian Federation,15 which explains active interaction between the two countries in all 
possible fields including politics, economics and culture.  Thus, the research about 
Mexico’s economic relationship with the United States would be a relevant example in 
terms of economic interactions between the developing and developed worlds.  
                                                 
14 Id. at 2. 
15 The length of the Kazakh-Russian border is approximately seven thousand kilometers, available at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200409/0021.shtml (last visited on March 3, 
2006). 
  
5
 
 
II. MEXICO AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
 
Historical Overview of FDI in Mexico 
 
     Mexico provides a useful basis for a case study of FDI because "Mexico has an 
economic and institutional history similar to that of many developing countries, 
particularly those of Latin America."16 The legal system in Mexico is “based on Spanish 
civil law with some influence of the common law tradition.”17  To evaluate Mexico's 
attitude to foreign direct investment, it is necessary to be familiar with the Mexican 
history of economic development and especially with the history of foreign direct 
investment.18 Foreign direct investment in Mexico has a long history and its prominent 
start was induced by the time General Porfirio Diaz19 “seized power in 1876, and the 
Mexican government committed itself to aggressively wooing foreign investments.”20 
FDI was needed for building infrastructure, especially railroads. Using foreign capital, 
about 24,000 kilometers or railroads were constructed by 1911.21 This spurred “the 
further development of export economies in Mexico’s agricultural and mining areas, the 
                                                 
16 SARAH BABB, MANAGING MEXICO: ECONOMISTS FROM NATIONALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM 12 (2001). 
17 TIM L. MERRILL & RAMON MIRO: MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY 244 (1997). 
18 Gloria Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third 
World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 282 (1994). 
19 Porfirio Diaz was president of Mexico two times: in 1876-80 and 1884-1911, available at 
http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/history/presidents.html (visited on April 7th, 2006). 
20 JURGEN BUCHENAU, MEXICO OTHERWISE, MODERN MEXICO IN THE EYES OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS, 91 
(2005). 
21 JAMES D. RUDOLPH: MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY 165 (1985). 
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modernization of the cities, and the emergence of a sizeable urban middle class.”22 At 
the time, foreign investment was “attracted to Mexico by its potential resources and by 
the political stability of the Porfirian peace.”23 The policy of attracting foreign investment 
influenced the development of foreign trade. In 1872 when Porfirio Diaz came to power 
the amount of imports and exports were $20 million and $29 million respectively, but by 
the end of his presidency these figures had increased tenfold to $205 million in imports 
and $293 million in exports.24 Trade with the United States “stands out as a dominant 
factor, especially with the construction of railroad connection between two countries.”25  
Most of Mexican history is connected with its powerful northern neighbor and this is 
probably one of the reasons Mexico continuously stresses the importance of national 
independence and sovereignty. The importance of protecting its sovereignty is entrenched 
in the Mexican Constitution where the following sectors of activities are under 
government control: “Petroleum and all hydrocarbons, basic petrochemicals, electricity, 
nuclear energy and radioactive materials, telegraph and radio telegraph services, satellite 
communication, railroads, mail service, money issue and coinage.”26 
     Throughout its economic history, Mexico has implemented different development 
policies but they have all emphasized national sovereignty. “Mexican economics 
encompassed a broad spectrum of tendencies, from Marxist to populist to 
                                                 
22 BUCHENAU, supra note 20, at 91.  
23 RUDOLPH, supra note 21, at 165. 
24 HUBERT C. HERRING & KATHARINE TERRILL, THE GENIUS OF MEXICO, LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE 
THE FIFTH SEMINAR IN MEXICO, 1930, 171 (1931). 
25 Id. at 171. 
26 SEYMOUR J. RUBIN & DEAN C. ALEXANDER: NAFTA AND INVESTMENT 6 (1995). 
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developmentalist – but was always and everywhere a fundamentally nationalist and 
statist discipline."27 
     Since foreign direct investment is an “investment made by a foreign individual or 
company in the productive capacity of another country,” 28 manufacturing and production 
have an important place in the economic development of a country. The disadvantage for 
Mexico lies in its dearth of coal, iron, and large waterfalls.29  Manufacturing large 
quantities of goods for export was a remote idea in the first half of the twentieth 
century.30   Such an opinion was buttressed by American and Mexican scholars.31   But by  
1994, twenty eight percent of the Mexico GDP (gross domestic product) derived from 
mining, manufacturing, and construction; “most industrial goods were produced, 
including automobiles, consumer goods, steel and petrochemicals.”32  
    By 1911, Porfirio Diaz’s tenure as president was coming to an end.33 At this time, 
growing concerns about Mexican sovereignty arose and, as a result, the growing 
nationalistic trends in Mexico’s relationship with the foreign investors became more 
significant as “the economic penetration of Mexico by foreign enterprises triggered a 
growing fear of increasing foreign influence.”34 During the Diaz presidency, Mexico 
modernized and became integrated into the world market but vital parts of its economy 
                                                 
27 BUBB, supra note 16, at 12. 
28 One of the definitions of foreign direct investment available at 
http://www.jubileeaustralia.org/512_jubilee_debt_jargon.php (last visited on April 6th, 2006). 
29 HERRING & TERRILL, supra note 20, at 170. 
30 Id, at 171. 
31 Id, at 170. 
32 MERRIL & MIRO, supra note 17, at XXVI. 
33 Porfirio Diaz was president of Mexico two times: in 1876-80 and 1884-1911, available at 
http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/history/presidents.html (visited on April 7th, 2006). 
34 Sandrino, supra note 18, at 283.  
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were under foreign control and thus the role of the Mexican government was limited to 
managing economic development.35  
      The Mexican revolution of 1910 was the event which reversed the political current of 
excessive foreign control over the economy. The constitution which followed embodied 
its revolutionary principles “including sovereignty and independence from foreign, 
economic, and political control.”36 
     In Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, ownership rights to “land, waters and their 
appurtenances” belong to Mexicans by “birth or naturalization.”37 In the same article, it is 
stipulated that foreigners can get the same right if they agree to be regarded as Mexican 
citizens, thus to become subjects under Mexican law, and not to invoke the protection of 
their governments.38 A very important part of the new constitution became Article 123, 
which regulated relationships between employers and employees and which had very 
socialist overtones.39  
     The impact of revolution initially was very negative, because the economy was 
disrupted and many of the gains achieved during the Porfiriato were destroyed.40 
In the first decade of the revolutionary era a national state barely existed in Mexico.41 
 The Great Depression of 192942 also negatively influenced the state’s welfare, bringing a 
“sharp drop in national income and internal demand after 1929” and challenging the 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917 COMPARED WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF 1857 18 (H.N. BRANCH, 
TRANS. AND ARRANGED, 1917). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 94 (Article 123 lists a wide variety of limitations on child labor and female labor, limitations on 
working hours and days. It also stipulates conditions for minimum wages, etc.) 
40  HERRING & TERRILL, supra note 24, at 145. 
41 RAYMOND VERNON, THE DILEMMA OF MEXICO’S DEVELOPMENT. THE ROLES OF THE PRIVATE AND 
PUBLIC SECTORS. 59 (1963). 
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country’s ability to fulfill its constitutional mandate of social equity.43 Nevertheless, the 
Great Depression did not hit the Mexican economy as hard as other countries and in the 
early 1930s a slow recovery started in manufacturing and other sectors.44 
     The nationalistic approach to protection of its economic independence continued in 
Mexico until the 1980s. “For more than sixty years, the interventionist, nationalist 
Mexican state, created by the Mexican Constitution, contributed significantly to the 
regulation of foreign direct investment.”45 During those times “this so-called nationalistic 
period, foreign direct investment provided the most direct challenge for the state 
policy.”46 
     In the 1930s, the main effect of the structural reforms was to further the process of 
nationalization. Nationalization involved such strategic sectors as the railroads and oil 
industries, and accelerated land reform.47 One of the most important industries in Mexico 
was and is the oil industry. “Each Mexican administration, in succession, tried to capture 
a share of the profits which oil exports were generating.”48 The battle for oil continued 
until 1938, when Lazaro Gardenas, president of Mexico from1934 to1940, nationalized 
the oil industry by expropriating assets of American and British oil companies.49 A strong 
tradition of viewing FDI with hostility is a ubiquitous feature in Latin America “with 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 The Great Depression of 1929 which took place in the United States of America. 
43 Id. at 146. 
44 Id. 
45 Sandrino, supra note 18, at 281. 
46 Id. 
47 MERRIL & MIRO, supra note 17, at 146. 
48 VERNON, supra note 41, at 77. 
49 Jim Tuck, Mr. Clean, The Phenomenon of Lazaro Cardenas 1990, available at 
http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/history/jtuck/jtlcardenas.html (last visited on April 9th, 2006). 
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Mexico being a prime example.”50 This tradition may be interpreted as “the imposition 
of strong foreigners on the local economy.”51 Following mass nationalization in the 
1930s, Mexico introduced a policy of import substitution in the 1940s.52 During World 
War II, Mexico sold oil to the United States and Great Britain.53 After World War II, 
President Valdez launched a full scale import-substitution program by raising import 
controls on consumer goods but relaxed them on capital goods, using international 
reserves accumulated during the war.54 The Mexican government took measures (e.g., 
undervaluing the peso) in order to reduce the prices of imported capital goods and 
increase productive capacity.55 This policy of import substitution and developing its own 
industry and infrastructure reflected the general policy elaborated by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)].56 The idea was based on denying 
classical economic theory about “comparative advantage” according to which rich and 
poor countries could specialize in different kinds of export and thus equally benefit from 
free international trade.57 Instead ECLA proclaimed that developing countries “[n]eeded 
at all costs to industrialize through active government policies aimed at protecting “infant 
industries” from foreign competition and protecting salaries to maintain demand for 
domestically produced industrial products.”58 
                                                 
50  MICHAEL J. TWOMEY, A CENTURY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 4 (2001), http://www-
personal.umd.umich.edu/~mtwomey/fdi/MexInv.pdf (last visited on April 9, 2006). 
51 Id.  
52 MERRIL &  MIRO, supra note 17, at 146. 
53 Jim Tuck, Mr. Clean: THE PHENOMENON OF LAZARO CARDENAS 1990, available at 
http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/history/jtuck/jtlcardenas.html (last visited on April 9th, 2006). 
54 MERRIL & MIRO, supra note 17, at 147. 
55 Id. 
56 BABB, supra note 16, at 7.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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Mexican Economic Miracle and Isolationism 
 
     In Mexico, the years 1940-1970 were the years of economic growth and of social and 
political stability referred to as the period of the “Mexican economic miracle.”59 During 
this period in Mexico industrial activity grew an average of 7.2% a year, and many of the 
country’s important businesses in the production of consumer goods were established.60 
As for foreign direct investment, the Great Depression slowed “the flow of foreign direct 
investment to a trickle,”61 and this type of foreign investment was not of great importance 
in Mexico’s “tightly regulated, isolationist economy.”62   In the 1950s, foreign direct 
investment in Mexico was only a small fraction of the GDP: 0.17.63 
     FDI as we know it now, appeared in the second half of the twentieth century; “its 
dominant mode-expansion by a firm which developed technology and productive 
capacity in its home country, to other sites via subsidiaries and branch plants had been 
nearly unknown before World War I in Mexico or anywhere else.”64 Most of the foreign 
loans in Mexico were used by foreigners who operated the railroads, public utilities, and 
                                                 
59 EMMANUEL RAUFFLE, THE BRIEF ACCOUNT OF MEXICO’S EXPERIENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSES 
3 (2004), http://zonecours.hec.ca/documents/H2005-P6-359694.ERauffletMexicoIntro.doc  (last visited on 
April 15, 2006). 
60 Id. 
61 BABB, supra note 16, at 7. 
62 Michael W. Goldman et al, An Introduction to Direct Investment in Mexico, 5 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 101, 101 (1994). 
63 STEPHEN HABER, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OR ENDOGENOUS PROCESS? THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF 
LATIN AMERICA, 46 (2005). 
http://www.stanford.edu/~haber/papers/Development_Strategy_or_Endogenous_%20Process-
The_Industrialization_of_Latin_America.pdf (last visited on April 15, 2006). 
64  MICHAEL J. TWONEY, A CENTURY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 14 (2001), http://www-
personal.umd.umich.edu/~mtwomey/fdi/MexInv.pdf (last visited on April 16th, 2006). 
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other free-standing companies. Lending of foreign capital to Mexican entrepreneurs 
was minimal.65 
     By the 1970s import substitution started to slow down, exhibiting the symptoms of 
chronic unemployment, chronic inflation, currency overvaluations and balance of 
payments problems.66 The situation was complicated by the so-called “rebirth” of global 
finance when it became possible for Latin American countries (including Mexico) to 
borrow from private foreign sources at variable interest rates to address “long-standing 
economic and social problems.”67 Due to the “anti-inflationary policy in the United 
States, global interest rates began to rise, heavily indebting governments, and in 1982 
Mexico, had the honor of inaugurating the Third World debt crisis when the Mexican 
finance minister declared that Mexico would be unable to continue servicing its external 
debt.”68   
     The policy of import substitution in Mexico still necessarily involved foreign 
investment in the industrial sector. “Mexico’s adoption of a nationalistic import-
substitution economic policy made it reliant on the United States for industrial 
technology.”69 The period of the economic miracle did not however affect the whole 
country; some regions suffered from high unemployment. Therefore, in 1965, the 
government of Mexico introduced the Border Industrialization Program which involved 
the creation of the Maquiladora Sector-a program to encourage the production of articles 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 BABB, supra note 16, at 9. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Melissa R. H. Hall, Foreigners Funding the Future: Investment Opportunities in Mexico’s Privatized 
Pension System, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 151, 154 (1999). 
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with foreign source components for export.70 This program was originally designed to 
“promote industrialization in the border region, to create sources of employment and to 
attract new technology in the hope that it could be integrated into Mexico’s industrial 
base.”71 Maquiladora plants were fully foreign-owned corporations where Mexico “relied 
on the foreign direct investment that arises from the operations of the Maquiladora 
industry to provide the economy with employment opportunities, technology and 
diversity.”72   The Maquiladora program was introduced after the United States 
prohibited Mexican seasonal workers from performing farm work in the United States 
(1964 cancellation of Bracero Programm).73 Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution 
stipulates that the minimum wage of an employee must be “sufficient to satisfy the 
normal material, social and cultural needs of heads of a family and provide for the 
compulsory education of his children.”74  American company owners of the factories in 
the Maqiladora sector do not pay the sufficient minimum wage. The average hourly wage 
“roughly calculates to about $4.46 for harder, and sometimes, life-threatening work that 
does not provide a Mexican family with enough food to keep from starving.”75 Already, 
through the example of the Maquiladora program, it was evident that the Mexican policy 
of import substitution did not completely exclude foreign investments. One commentator 
                                                 
70 RUBIN, ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 38. 
71 Id. 
72 Jenna L. Acuff, The Race to the Bottom: The United States’ Influence on Mexican Labor Law 
Enforcement, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 387, 404 (2004). 
73 Id. at 392. 
74 Id. at 405. 
75 Id. 
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suggests that “the Mexican government has the philosophy that any job is better than 
no job, even a low-paying one.”76  
 
1973 Foreign Investment Law  
 
     Until 1973, Mexico had no single investment code on foreign investments and rules 
on this activity “were characterized by an emphasis on increasing exports and protecting 
existing national industries from domestic competition by foreign investors.”77 In 
addition, the rules on foreign investments were represented by the various decrees 
“issued by the executive branch on a case-by-case basis.”78 Throughout the era of the 
Mexican economic miracle, the Mexican government was flexible and its attitude 
towards foreign investors was “one of cautious acceptance.”79 Mexico, as any country, 
was longing for foreign direct investments, and, as any county, was facing the problem 
“of gain[ing] just that amount and kind of foreign investment (and technology) that is 
desired to complement and support their development objectives while not losing the 
benefits through competitive incentives by permitting them to flow out of the country.”80 
Before the 1973 Foreign Investment Law (1973 FIL),81 foreign investments were 
controlled by the Emergency Decree of 1944 whose purpose was to “avert disruption of 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 RUBIN & ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 87. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 JACK N. BEHRMAN, DECISION CRITERIA FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, XI 
(1974). 
81 The Emergency Decree of 1944 issued by the Mexican President granted control over foreign investment 
to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. 
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the economy caused by the investments of temporary foreign capital.”82 The official 
name of the 1973 FIL was: 1973 Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la 
Inversion Extranjera [Law for Promoting Mexican Investment and Regulating Foreign 
Investment] which indicates its purpose to regulate foreign investment while promoting 
Mexican investment.83 Introducing the 1973 FIL, the government officially 
acknowledged that: 1) import replacement policies alone were not sufficient to solve its 
serious economic problems, 2) Mexican manufacturers needed to produce export-oriented 
products and capital goods and 3) Mexico needed foreign assistance to improve 
technology, stimulate investment in new industries, and manufacture goods for export.84 
As the first legislation regulating foreign investment, it looked restrictive to many foreign 
entrepreneurs.  The general comment was that “this law was too anti-foreign investor and 
the international business community did not react positively.”85 One of the main 
obstacles in the 1973 FIL was Article 5, which limited foreign ownership in Mexican 
corporations to forty-nine percent.86 A significant exception to this limitation exists in 
relation to Maquiladora industries which may be 100% foreign-owned.87 But even with 
these restrictions, the United States and other countries were ready to invest in Mexico’s 
economy. The “country’s sustained growth during the preceding three decades, the 
discovery of huge petroleum reserves and a relatively stable political climate made 
                                                 
82 RUBIN & ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 87. 
83 Hall, supra note 69, at 154. 
84 Goldman et al., supra note 62, at 101, 107. 
85 RUBIN & ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 88. 
86 Id. 
87 Id, at 7. 
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Mexico an attractive location for direct investment.” 88 Most investment was in 
infrastructure and technology.89 The 1973 FIL repeated the conditions stipulated in the 
Mexican Constitution with respect to activities reserved to the Mexican government and 
domestic investors such as petroleum, exploitation of radioactive minerals, electricity, 
railroad, and telegraphic and wireless communications.90 The key body for administering 
investment law was the National Foreign Investment Commission (NFIC)], which was 
established by the Mexican Congress. NFIC possessed “broad discretionary power over 
whether and to what extent to allow foreign investment.”91 This discretionary power 
included establishing rules and guidelines  and adjudicating issues raised under the 1973 
FIL, specifically the authority to increase or decrease the percentage of foreign 
investment in different geographical or economic zones, permit higher levels of foreign 
ownership in “exceptional circumstances and also establish criteria and requirements 
concerning foreign investment.”92 The conditions placed on increasing the share of 
foreign ownership are listed in Article 13 of 1973 FIL: 1) complementing national 
investment strategies, such as increasing exports; 2) providing new employment 
opportunities for Mexican workers; 3) contributing to the development of economically 
less developed regions; 4) respecting the country’s social and cultural values; and 5) 
assisting in the country’s technological research and development.93 These characteristics 
would justify the country’s efforts to “encourage long-term sustainable growth” targeted 
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by country-hosting foreign investments.94 Another basic condition stipulated in the 
1973 FIL was also regarded by foreign entrepreneurs as a hindrance to doing business in 
this country, The “Calvo Clause” which mandates that foreigners doing business in 
Mexico waive their foreign status (diplomatic protection) while defending themselves in 
Mexican courts.95 As mentioned above, the 1973 FIL did little to discourage foreign 
direct investment in Mexico during the 1970s. The Mexican government and its agencies 
“still enjoyed too much discretion to expand or limit the possible areas of investment.”96 
     Why do foreign direct investments continue to enter into Mexico? Legal 
considerations play a large role in the decision to create FDI, but “legal concerns are not 
themselves the driving force in the initial calculations.”97 In the case of Mexico, “other 
factors play a greater role, such as the importance of access to raw materials, the size and 
scope of the foreign market, or the geographical position of the target country in relation 
to other important markets.”98 In 1976, Mexico’s financial situation (capital flight, 
inflation, external account imbalances) “demanded more than domestic policy 
changes.”99 The Central bank of Mexico had to devalue the peso and President 
Echeveria’s administration asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help and the 
resulting Mexico-IMF agreement “obligated Mexico to change a number of its economic 
policies as a condition to lending,”100 and “[s]imply put, multilateral and U.S. 
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government agencies, such as the World Bank, IMF and U.S. Treasury, were 
committed to using debt relief as a lever to win market-oriented policy reforms from the 
governments of developing countries.”101 The agreement with the IMF lasted only three 
years.102 Massive oil discoveries in the late 1970s caused a short “rebirth” of nationalistic 
policy focusing on a domestic agenda which resulted in heavy borrowings from 
international financial firms based on future oil projections.103 
 
1993 Foreign Investment Law and North American Free Trade Agreement  
(NAFTA) 
      In 1981, due to a sharp fall in oil prices, Mexico entered a period of deep economic 
crisis.104 This time was regarded by the government as an optimal time for economic 
reform.105 President Miguel De La Madrid Hurtado106 started the structural reform with 
the purpose of redirecting the economy from its “traditional state-led development and 
trade protectionist strategy.”107 One of the most important steps was to open the domestic 
market to foreign competition and a crucial step towards this goal was taken in 1986 
when Mexico became a full member of General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs  
(GATT),108 “which initiated a gradual elimination of some restrictions to foreign 
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investment, particularly in capital and technology intensive industries.”109 Before 
entering GATT, initial restructuring took place. In 1984 the Mexican government 
cancelled the 49% ceiling on certain priority sectors. Then in 1985 the Mexican 
government allowed foreign investors currently holding majority ownership interests in 
Mexican business enterprises to raise their ownership interests to 100%.110 These 
measures were followed by renegotiation with the IMF and other commercial 
institutions.111 These and other measures, together with membership in GATT, promoted 
confidence on the part of investors.112 
     In 1989, then President Carlos Salinas de Gortari,113 issued new 1989 Regulations on 
the 1973 FIL (1989 Regulations).114 The official name of the document was: 
“Reglamento de la Ley para Promover da Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion 
Extranjera (Regulations of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate 
Foreign Investment).”115 The Mexican Constitution gives the President the power to enact 
regulations but the scope of regulation is necessarily limited to the underlying law.116 A 
regulation contradicting the law could be described as unconstitutional by the Mexican 
Supreme Court of Justice.117 The purpose of the 1989 Regulations was to help open 
Mexico to foreign investment, but at the same time they had the potential to cause legal 
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problems, since these regulations were “vague and confusing in many areas, and the 
Mexican government exercises great discretion in interpreting many of its provisions.”118 
Moreover, the 1989 Regulations as they are written appear to violate certain provisions of 
Mexico’s Constitution.” 119 One clear contradiction between the 1973 FIL and 1989 
Regulations is the reduction of Foreign Investment Commission role on deciding 
ownership percentage by foreign investors. “The new regulations severely diminish the 
NFIC’s authority in many areas and permit 100% foreign ownership in most industries 
without requiring any NFIC authorization.”120 The regulations also cut numerous criteria 
(from 17 to 5) for consideration whether to permit a particular foreign investment in a 
restricted area.121 
     Did a potential foreign investor have to worry about the dubious character of new 
regulations? Taking into consideration at least two factors, there do not appear to be 
serious reasons for such concerns. First issuing the Regulations was the 
 responsibility of the president, and the presidency in Mexico is the paramount institution, 
which critics labeled as the “six-year monarchy” due to “seemingly unchecked power that 
historically resided in the office.” 122 And second, because of the Amparo – a unique 
Mexican procedure for challenging the constitutionality of a law or an administrative 
action by an individual through petition to the appropriate tribunal (that is, only Mexican 
federal courts, including the Supreme Court).123 A competitor, who suffered due to a 
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foreign investor, may invoke the Amparo procedure, but even if he wins the case and is 
granted an injunction, there will not be a “blanket” injunction against further government 
acts, since there is no stare decisis in the Mexican federal courts.124 As for the Calvo 
Clause mentioned earlier, in 1992, Mexican legislators, in order to support foreign 
investment, enacted The Execution of Treaties Law, a very important addition to 
Mexican Legal System.125 The importance of this law lies in the ability of the Mexican 
government to make international treaties and agreements attracting international dispute 
settlement mechanisms, since today’s international investors prefer to solve contractual 
disputes with the help of international commercial arbitration, forum of law and choice of 
law clauses.126 It would be also relevant to mention that Mexico is a signatory to the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, also referred to as the New York Convention, and to the Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, which is also called the Panama 
Convention.127  Both conventions give foreign investors confidence to use a legal basis 
for “enforcement of any arbitral agreement.”128 As a member of these treaties, Mexico 
agreed to “permit its citizens and its businesses to agree to have disputes resolved in 
accordance with international norms rather than those established by its own 
government.”129 
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Pursuing the policy of accelerating foreign investment in Mexico, President Salinas 
started talks with President George H. W. Bush about a free trade and investment 
agreement.130 With this new agreement the United States planned to “remove existing 
barriers” for foreign investors, and in order to reach this objective it was necessary to 
replace the existing law to promote Mexican investment and to regulate foreign 
investment with a new law.131 On December 28, 1993 Mexico adopted the new 1993 
Foreign Investment Law (1993 FIL).132  
     The task of the new law was “to formulate the rules to channel foreign investment into 
the Nation and to ensure that said investment contributes to the national development.”133 
The new law codified many of the 1989 Regulations to answer the requirements 
stipulated by the NAFTA.134 
     The 1993 FIL had new provisions that were contrary to the 1973 FIL such as 
cancellation of the rule 49/51 that gave foreign investors minority ownership in the 
capital stock of Mexican companies. Now foreign investors can control up to 100% of the 
capital stock of a Mexican enterprise, though with specific limitations depending on 
certain industrial areas.135 Other provisions contrary to the 1973 FIL include the 
elimination of most performance requirements, which earlier gave power to NFIC to 
authorize foreign investment projects, and now left NFIC with only few evaluations of 
foreign investment projects such as: 
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1. The impact on employment and training of workers 
2. The technological contribution of the project 
3. Fulfillment of environmental provisions  
4. The project’s general contribution to the increase in competency of the productive 
goals of the country.136 
     Some provision of the 1973 FIL were incorporated into the new 1993 FIL unchanged, 
for instance the activities reserved exclusively to the Mexican government or to Mexican 
citizens and Mexican companies.137 Because the Mexican government accepted, under 
NAFTA, that it must allow foreign investment in the construction of ducts for the 
transportation of oil and its derivatives as well as the perforation of oil and gas wells, an 
innovation in the 1993 FIL gave permission to foreign investors to participate in the 
Mexican oil industry.138 President Salina’s administration, while facing many political 
obstacles including clear opposition from some sectors of his party, managed to 
overcome them and achieve this change.139 
     Following passage of the 1993 FIL, on January 1, 1994 Mexico entered the NAFTA 
agreement with Canada and the United States, creating a free trade area where tariffs and 
other barriers to trade were greatly reduced.140 Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, Mexico 
was obliged to “accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that 
it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors…,” a standard known as “national 
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treatment”.141 NAFTA also provides Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment, which 
requires every party to this agreement to treat other parties of NAFTA and their 
investments no less favorably than third-party investors and investment.142 Both the 1973 
FIL and the 1989 regulations contained lengthy and burdensome lists of performance 
requirements.143 An important provision of NAFTA’s investment chapter repeals these 
performance requirements, which had been one of the major obstacles faced by foreign 
investors in Mexico.144 The performance requirements were one of the major obstacles 
for foreign investors in Mexico.145 Article 1106 of NAFTA eliminates such barriers, 
enumerating these requirements and strictly prohibiting a party from imposing or 
enforcing them in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-
Party in its territory.146 This Article however did not repeal the performance requirements 
completely: 
 A party may still condition the receipt of an advantage, in connection with 
an investment in its territory of a party or of a nonparty, on compliance 
with the requirement to locate production, provide a service, train or 
employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out 
research and development in its territory.147  
 
     Law is a very important feature necessary for economic development and particularly 
with foreign direct investment law plays a crucial role in the process of market-oriented 
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development.148 Law has two purposes: 1) to define and enforce private rights, 
especially the rights of foreign investors, and 2) to create the legal foundations for 
market-oriented reform, which can guarantee the basis for economic development, 
stability, and growth.149 As for the rights of foreign investors, NAFTA did not include a 
Calvo Clause as an instrument in a dispute resolution. “NAFTA provides the most 
remarkable and groundbreaking evidence of Latin America’s new attitude toward 
international jurisdiction and law.”150 Chapter Eleven of NAFTA establishes a complex 
mechanism for the settlement of private investment disputes for alleged breaches of 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven Section A obligations.151 This dispute settlement mechanism 
provides for resolution via international arbitration, rather than by a NAFTA dispute 
panel.152 
     Among NAFTA members, disputes may be settled through international arbitration in 
accordance with the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Convention153 or the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules,154 
or through litigation before the courts of the NAFTA state, at the election of the 
investor.155 For the first time, Mexico has entered into an international agreement 
providing for investor-state arbitration.156 
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     NAFTA also has provisions covering expropriation and compensation. No party 
may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor in its 
territory or take a measure, except when nationalization is: (a) for a public purpose; (b) 
on a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and with 
treatment  in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment; 
and (d) is accompanied by payment to compensation equivalent to fair market value, paid 
without delay and fully realizable with interest from the date of expropriation.157  
     NAFTA sets a very important example for third world countries in terms of changing 
attitudes about foreign investment.158 Like Mexico, debt-burdened Third World countries 
try to attract foreign investment by entering into arrangements that are changing the 
traditional rules of investment protection, but none of these arrangements “has the broad 
scope of protection for foreign investment found in the investment provisions in 
NAFTA.”159 
     It would be useful to give a final look at the progress in Mexico’s approach to foreign 
direct investment in a short review of 1973 and 1993 foreign investment laws. Both laws 
have a purpose to channel FDI into the country on the condition of complementing 
national development, but if 1973 FIL gave preference to Mexican investors and set 
limitations for the foreign ones, 1993 FIL stresses the importance of the foreign 
investment. 1973 FIL had a permit for only 49% of foreign ownership of Mexican 
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companies.160 1993 FIL demised this rule and allowed foreign investors to have up to 
100% shares in Mexican companies.161  Another vital change in 1993 FIL was the 
reduction of performance requirements from seventeen to four, thus also limiting the role 
of NFIC.162 In spite of Mexico’s desire to make 1993 FIL attractive for foreign investors, 
this law still keeps the restrictive features of 1973 FIL, such as: activities reserved only 
for  the Mexican government and Mexican companies and people.163 And even the 
permission to buy 100% shares in Mexican companies is limited by the sort of activity 
where acquisition may vary from ten to forty nine percent of ownership and this list of 
activities covers more than thirty names. 1993 FIL alone would be another source of 
criticism from liberal economists, however NAFTA not only enforced the incentives for 
foreign direct investment stipulated earlier in 1993 FIL but also widened the conditions 
for International trade.164 
 
 
Summary for Mexico 
 
     This section on Mexico traces the love-hate relationship between FDI and this Central 
American country. It becomes apparent that, most of the time, Mexican political thought 
centered on achieving self-sufficiency and that  the “perceived need for self-
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determination via isolationism resulted from years of oppression under Spanish rule 
and was augmented by United States’ aggression in 1840’s.”165 The negative and 
suspicious attitude was also burdened by Mexico’s aversion to foreign economic control 
and political influence that can be “traced back to the administration of Porfirio Diaz.”166 
The principles of the Mexican Revolution included sovereignty and independence from 
foreign economic and political control.167  The Mexican Constitution of 1917, which 
embodied these principles, discouraged, and in some areas prevented foreign direct 
investment in Mexico for more than seventy years.168 In the 1980s, Mexico recognized 
the necessity of attracting foreign investments and started “a major modification of its 
foreign investment legislation.”169 Modifications included the 1993 FIL and participation 
in NAFTA. According to Freeman, “The implementation of NAFTA and the New 
Foreign Investment Law clears all doubts about the scope of the Calvo Clause in the 
Constitution and marks a new era in Mexico’s international relations.”170 It is very 
difficult to describe in a few words a political creed of this very important country, 
because: 
 Unlike many other countries that have been committed to some ideology, 
such as private capitalism, free enterprise, or socialism, Mexico has never 
for long placed itself in an ideological straitjacket. At certain times and in 
relation to specific events, such ideologies as nationalism, socialism, and 
communism have attracted popular support. Yet rigid adherence to 
ideology or doctrine has rarely hindered Mexico’s development drive.171  
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      The era of President Salinas produced dramatic changes in the Mexican legal 
system “so vast and deep that in those days it was common to refer to them as a legal 
revolution.”172 Generally, public opinion supported those changes which were “shared by 
capitalist groups, the general populace, and high-ranking federal officials,” who 
enthusiastically proclaimed that Mexico had already become “a first world country.”173 
Mexico’s membership in the OECD174 buttressed this opinion.175 A critical examination 
reveals that Mexico “probably has not really given up anything, but has only gained.”176 
For example, the Calvo Clause is still “enshrined” in the Mexican Constitution, so all 
foreign investment laws and regulations adopted after 1985 can be revoked.177 One of the 
reasons Mexico chose NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms was to avoid political 
interference in dispute resolution, “thus eliminating the need for foreign governments’ 
asserting diplomatic protection on behalf of their investors.”178  These facts, plus non-
refusal from Calvo Clause and the availability of international tools for dispute 
resolution, show that Mexico regarded the years of liberal reforms as a trial period and 
did not completely depart from its policy of economic independence. After ten years of 
NAFTA, the concerns of its opponents have not been reduced by the passage of time and 
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“neither has the enthusiasm of its supporters been toned down.”179 NAFTA’s advocates 
list positive impacts of this agreement such as increased FDI (40%), the exports growth 
(25%), higher per capita income (5%), and the availability of emergency loans to cure the 
consequences of crises (a $50 billion support loan from the U.S. Treasury).180 Opponents 
say that all NAFTA benefits were “more than compensated by its adverse effects on the 
overall economy” and that benefits realized from the Agreement “have been highly 
concentrated in relatively few firms.”181 The opponents also note the “erosion of 
Mexico’s inter-industrial links,” the reduction of Mexico’s potential long-term economic 
growth and the widening gap between the “haves” and “have-nots.”182 What may seem 
like a success story, in fact, undermines economic development. The success has been 
achieved “at the expense of the labor employed in these areas by the systematic lowering 
of regulations.”183 Export Processing Zones remain simply assembly zones with the 
materials being imported by the firms, assembled and then exported. For example “Ford’s 
state-of-the-art engine assembly plant in Chihuahua exports more than 90% of its 
production, and uses almost no local inputs other than labor.”184 We see the development 
“with little in government revenue to improve the infrastructure of the country and no 
possibility of local firms breaking into the supply chain.”185  
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There are also problems with the Mexican legal culture which “have a high rate of 
concentration and practical use in urban centers like Mexico City, Guadalajara or 
Monterey because of a common level of education, economic means and national cultural 
patterns.”186 In rural areas, legal culture resources as well as basic economic means for 
survival are absent; fifty million out of a total population of one hundred million in 
Mexico lives at or below the poverty level.187 Only when Mexico becomes a middle class 
country like the United States or Canada will the legal culture in that country become 
varied and equally distributed and this can be done through the strengthening of the 
educational system at all levels.188 
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III. KAZAKHSTAN AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
Overview of Economic Situation in Kazakhstan in 1990s 
 
     It is difficult to write about modern Kazakhstan in general and about foreign direct 
investments in particular. The reason lies in the short history of sovereignty of this new 
state in Central Asia. The Republic of Kazakhstan is the second largest republic in the 
former Soviet Union.189. The large territory accommodates a disproportionately small 
population of fifteen million people, consisting of different nationalities. The main ethnic 
groups are: Kazakh 53.4%, Russian 30%, Ukrainian-3.7%, Uzbek-2.5%, German-2.4, 
Tatar 1.7%, Uygur 1.4% and 4.7% are other nationalities.190 As a Soviet republic, 
Kazakhstan’s economy was an inseparable part of the whole Soviet economic system of 
central planning and state-owned enterprises. The economic foundation of the Soviet 
Union was the principle of centralized economic planning.191  The central planning had a 
universal character when “[a]ll of production and supply is subordinated to centralized 
tasks.”192 Mostly the planning was performed on two levels: the top one was the USSR 
Council of Ministers (Gosplan) and the lower one covered the Republican Council of 
                                                 
189The territory of Kazakhstan is 2,7 million square kilometers available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kz.html (last visited on June 13, 2006). 
190 Id. 
191 See OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, MARK W. JANIS, SOVIET LAW AND ECONOMY, 8 (1986)  
192 Id. at 9. 
  
33
Ministers (republican Gosplans).193 Foreign trade in this respect was under strict 
government control and was a part of the State’s foreign policy, “In the earliest years 
following its creation, the foreign policy of the Soviet State was aimed primarily at 
ensuring survival in an extremely hostile environment which threatened it on all sides.”194 
At that time, for the Soviet Union foreign trade meant large scale procurement of 
Western technology. Without American and European firms, the Soviet Union probably 
would not have been able to construct and develop its steel and chemical industry, its 
automotive industry, electro-technical industry and military industrial complex.195 For 
instance, the biggest automotive plant in Gorky, (today Nizhnyi Novgorod)  Russia was 
built in the 1930s with the help of the Ford Company, and the whole agriculture tractor 
plant was imported from the Chicago suburbs to the city of Stalingrad (today Volgograd) 
and assembled there by the American companies International Harvester and Albert 
Kahn, Inc.196 The main purpose of such contracts was the creation and development of  
an independent Soviet industry.197 It was all done through the agreements on “technical 
cooperation and aid” under which the USSR paid hard currency to Western companies.198 
This kind of technical cooperation with foreign companies existed throughout the history 
of the USSR. When the Soviet government was interested in developing technological 
projects with foreign expertise, it usually negotiated and bought the whole project, but 
foreign direct investment did not exist in the Soviet economy.  The Soviet Union mostly 
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sold its raw materials to the developed countries and in exchange bought equipment 
and technology from them.199 Soviet leadership did not want “something foreign, born of 
another type of organization and principles and transplanted into their system,” because it 
would “not produce the same effect that it gives in its own environment.”200  
     The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December of 1991.  “The dramatic events that 
followed the change of leadership in 1985, culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.”201 As for Kazakhstan, on December 16, 1991, “a new law establishing the state 
independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan was approved.”202 This independence was 
not long awaited and dreamt of by the people and leadership of Kazakhstan. “Kazakhstan 
was the last republic to leave the Soviet Union on December 16, 1991, following the 
surprise announcement on December 8th by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine that they were 
forming the Commonwealth of Independent States.”203  
At the very beginning of its independence Kazakhstan faced many urgent problems, such 
as “formation, strengthening and perfection of its statehood, ”transition from one type of 
economy to another, problems of creating conformity in legislation and accepted models 
of development among other things.204 Politically, the transition to independence went 
smoothly enough to avoid ethnic tensions. In the Soviet era, Kazakhstan was called “the 
laboratory of friendship” since more than a hundred nationalities called Kazakhstan their 
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home.205 Also because the Great Silk Route206 passed through Kazakhstan forming a 
bridge between Asia and Europe the local population “has always been opened for 
international dialogue.”207 Kazakh people throughout their history have led a nomadic life 
and the source of Kazakh law was a customary law, “Historically, the most favorable 
conditions for Islamic culture were the permanent settlements and city-states.”208 Islam 
was not the religion of all Kazakh people. “While traces of fiqh and Shari’a of Islam can 
be found in indigenous Kazakh law, Islam does not constitute a significant part of 
Kazakhstan’s legal heritage.”209 The important influence on Kazakh law came from 
Mongol law; “several portions of Kazakh law were taken directly from Great Yasa (law) 
of the Mongols, and has also illuminated other portions of Kazakh law on which the Yasa 
had a significant effect.”210  In 1928, eleven years after the Great October Revolution in 
Russia, a Decree was enacted about “the struggle against crimes based on customs,” 
which “[p]rohibited many of the practices that were required or provided for in Kazakh 
law.”211 
     Like other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan went through a difficult time of 
modernization and transformation from a strictly centralized economy. The 
manufacturing sector of the economy has it roots mostly in the World War II era, when 
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Kazakhstan became the beneficiary of massive transplants of industries. 212 That is 
probably one of the reasons that, Kazakhstan has “a bifurcated economy, with heavy 
industry and collectivized agriculture in the north and large--scale agriculture--primarily 
cotton--in the south.”213  
     As part of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan shared its civil law tradition.214 The 
constitution in a civil law tradition is “the core of the whole system of legislation and 
incorporates the basic definitions.”215 In order to build a new democratic and civil society 
where human rights, freedoms and the rule of law would be a priority, the leadership of 
the country brought together experts from Great Britain, the United States and 
Kazakhstan to draft a new constitution.216 The first constitution of independent 
Kazakhstan was adopted on January 28, 1993.217  
     After reading this document thirteen years later, one may have the impression that the 
country did not yet define its true paradigm of socioeconomic development. The 1993 
Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan embodied many social features inherited 
from the Soviet Union, for example, in a section on economic and social conditions, one 
can read that, “A citizen of the Republic shall have the right to working conditions 
meeting security and sanitary requirements, and also to social protection from 
unemployment.”218 The payment-reward for the labor “should not be less than the 
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minimal wages set by law.”219 The Constitution also stipulated the right of citizens to 
housing, not only promoting “implementation of the right to housing by encouraging 
house-building” but also by “selling of dwellings from the state housing fund.”220 The 
same socially-oriented attitude referred to health care and education, but the important 
feature which is clearly seen  though the whole section on economic and social rights are 
the conditions involving private initiative - letting private education and private 
healthcare exist and develop together with the State institutions providing services in this 
field.221 The first constitution proclaimed Kazakhstan to be a democratic, secular and 
unitary state, but did not emphasize the leading role of the presidency as was done in the 
succeeding constitution. Also it gave more discretion to the Parliament which not only 
was involved in the law making but also: a) elected the Constitutional Court; b) elected 
the Supreme Court and the High Court of Arbitration, c) appointed the Prosecutor-
General, and d) appointed the Chairman of the National Bank. 222  Of course, the first 
constitution paid attention to the new forms of economy such as private property and 
private entrepreneurship. It declared that “[p]rivate property shall be inviolable. The State 
shall guarantee the freedom of entrepreneurship activity and ensure its defense and 
support”.223 At the same time the constitution stipulated the intention of the State to keep 
“[l]and, its bowels, rivers and lakes, flora and fauna, other natural resources” as its 
“exclusive property.”224 
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     According to the first Constitution, foreigners, legal entities and “persons not 
admitted to citizenship” were participants in entrepreneurial activity and were under the 
protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan “as stipulated by laws and interstate agreements 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan”.225 
      In the beginning of 1995 the Republic of Kazakhstan found itself in the “midst of a 
constitutional crisis” the result of which was the dissolution of the parliament.226 The first 
Constitution did not help to fulfill the embodied tasks especially in regulating the jobs of 
the legislative and executive branches, since the Kazakh parliament at that time “still 
embodied the bulky mechanism of its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh 
SSR, and lacked any real mechanism for the execution of legislative initiative.”227 
A new constitution was adopted in August 1995 by national referendum.228 The new 
constitution gave more power to the president by saying, “The Republic of Kazakhstan is 
a unitary state with a presidential form of government.”229 This time the President took 
almost all appointing functions of the key executive officials except “election and 
discharge from the office, the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Chairpersons of the 
Collegium of Justice, and judges of the Supreme Court of the Republic and the proposal 
of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and swearing them into office”, which 
was the duty of the upper chamber of the parliament (senate).230 
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The two-chamber parliament was left mostly with law-making and approval tasks.231  
The new Constitution confirmed the preceding Constitution’s social protection of citizens 
in terms of labor conditions, health care and housing, but paid more attention to 
individual freedoms.232 Also the new Constitution did not pay much attention to the 
business activity of foreign citizens except to give them “rights and freedoms as well as 
responsibilities established for the Kazakh citizens unless otherwise stipulated by the 
Constitution, laws and international treaties.”233 In the 1993 Constitution a whole section 
was devoted to property and entrepreneurship.234 One more important feature was 
transferred from the 1993 Constitution to the 1995 Constitution; the State confirmed its 
intention to keep owning “the land and underground resources, waters, flora and fauna, 
other natural resources.”235 Also, in the same article, the new Constitution adds, “The 
land may also be privately owned on terms, conditions and within the limits established 
by legislation.”236  The constitution thus reveals the attitude of the new Kazakh State to 
the market economy, its readiness for foreign direct investment, international competition 
and foreign business activity in the country.  
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1990 Foreign Investment Law and Auxiliary Laws Facilitating Investments 
 
In reference to the readiness of Kazakhstan for foreign direct investment we will shortly 
explore the document dated December 7, 1990 and which is called “Law of the Kazakh 
SSR on Foreign Investments in the Kazakh SSR, adopted Dec. 7, 1990.”237 The date of 
this document suggests that the demand for foreign investments appeared earlier than 
independence itself.238 In the early 1990s, the republics of the Soviet Union started the 
program of privatizing State enterprises. 
     To be successful, privatization in countries with centrally-planned economies must 
attract foreign capital for the modernization of their facilities, adopt foreign management 
skills in order to capitalize in new technology, and provide sufficient internal financial 
and production controls. To attract foreign participation, a country would want to enact 
investment laws that facilitate the movement of capital into and out of the country.239  
With this mindset the leadership of Kazakhstan drafted and adopted the law on foreign 
investment. This Soviet era law was drafted to attract foreign investors and included 
necessary basic incentives. It was short, comprised of only twenty nine articles.240 To 
start with, one can see that that this law had no restriction on formation of enterprises; 
foreign entities could have any percentage of ownership in joint ventures and also could 
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have fully owned enterprises.241 Foreign investors had a one-year grace period to start 
operating a business before re-licensing.242 The foreign investor, who brought property 
into Kazakhstan not for sale, but as an investment, did not have to pay custom duties.243 
Personal property of foreign specialists working at enterprises with foreign participation 
was also not subject to custom duties.244 To provide additional tax incentives, the share of 
the foreign investor in the enterprise was not to be less than 30%.245 These tax incentives 
were: five years free from income tax if employed in the production and services listed in 
the annex to this law; after five years only 50% on income tax for the next five years.246 
This law also guaranteed protection of foreign intellectual property.247 Nationalization 
was not allowed and only in exceptional cases could the property of the enterprise with 
foreign participation be requisitioned. Requisition was followed by full compensation of 
the losses by the Government of Kazakh SSR.248 Under this law Kazakh SSR guaranteed 
foreign investors the free transfer abroad of profits from business activity and liquidation 
of the legal entities with foreign participation, and also in the case of investors’ shares in 
those enterprises being sold.249 As for resolution of disputes between the legal entities 
with foreign participation and the state organs of the republic, the law offered state 
arbitration, the republican courts, or, by agreement of the parties, the dispute could be 
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resolved in an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the legislation of the Republic.250 
Article 29 of the 1990 investment law contained an important condition: “If an 
international agreement or treaty of the Republic establishes rules of dispute resolution 
other than those under this law, the rules of an international agreement or treaty must be 
applied.”251 At this time to adopt only one law to attract foreign direct investment, even a 
very progressive one, was not enough. In the 1990s, almost simultaneously with the law 
on foreign investment, a number of other laws designated to facilitate foreign investment 
in Kazakhstan were adopted:  
a) The law of the Kazakh SSR on Property, adopted December 15, 1990, which on 
the one hand confirmed the constitutional right of the State to own “…[t]he earth, its 
bowels, rivers and lakes…,” and on the other hand let the foreigners own  property and 
guaranteed stability of property relations. 
b) The law of the Kazakh SSR on Leasing, adopted Feb. 2, 1990, under which “Land 
and other natural resources can be leased.” 
c)  The law of the Kazakh SSR on Free Enterprise and Development of 
Entrepreneurship in the Kazakh SSR, adopted Dec. 11, 1990, under which the 
government identified the objects of foreign investments, on the territory of the Kazakh 
SSR as: “enterprises, which share participation in the property of Soviet juridical entities, 
shares and other securities and such other property as well as the acquired property rights 
to use natural resources in the Kazakh SSR for carrying out the economic and any  such 
activity on the Kazakh SSR territory.”    
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d) The law of the Kazakh SSR on Free Economic Zones in the Kazakh SSR, 
adopted Dec. 15, 1990. This law was intended to create “specially allocated territory with 
clearly defined administrative borders and special legal conditions established with the 
aim of attracting foreign capital, progressive foreign technology and management 
experience for accelerated social and economic development of the territory of the 
zone.”252 The tax incentives in these free economic zones were as attractive as those in 
the law on foreign investments.253 
     An abundance of mineral resources and a stable political situation could make 
Kazakhstan an attractive object for investment, the 2004 estimated oil proved reserves are 
twenty--six billion barrels and estimated reserves of natural gas are three trillion cubic 
meters.254  
In addition, Kazakhstan accounted for “ninety percent of the chrome reserves of the 
former Soviet Union, fifty percent of the tungsten and lead, and forty percent of the zinc 
and copper deposits. Kazakhstan was one of the Soviet Union’s bread baskets, producing 
about thirty-three percent of its total agricultural production.” 255 Post Soviet Kazakhstan 
managed to escape “the ethnic tension which has infected the Caucasian republics and the 
Central Asian states”, and the country is regarded as “one of the most stable states of the 
former Soviet Union.”256 Moreover, Kazakhstan itself was seeking foreign direct 
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investment because “foreign participation helps to introduce new technology and 
establish adequate systems of management and quality control.”257  The President of 
Kazakhstan “has repeatedly emphasized that foreign investment and strong foreign 
relations are essential for the effective development of Kazakhstani natural resources,” 
and “[s]ince Kazakhstani policy is to attract foreign investors, legislation is intended to 
create a favorable investment climate.”258 Later, research on foreign investment has 
demonstrated that Kazakhstan, in comparison with other former Soviet republics, “carries 
a relatively low risk” for foreign investors.259 The successful policy of attracting foreign 
investment has resulted in a $25 billion, 40-year term contract with a major American oil 
company, Chevron, and the consequent entrance into the Kazakhstan market of other 
leading oil companies such as British Gas, British Petroleum, Italian Agip, Mobil and 
French Elf-Aquitaine.260 But the goal of Kazakhstan’s leadership was not only to attract 
international attention as an important source of oil, gas and mineral resources, but also to 
seek “foreign direct investment in other sectors, including agriculture, light industry, 
power, tourism, and infrastructure. The development of these sectors will enable the 
country to establish a diversified economy and avoid the problems encountered by some 
other economies dependent on energy production.”261 
 
                                                 
257 Mitrofanskaya, supra note 239, at 1432. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Dosmukhamedov, supra note 207, at 94. 
261  OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members, Investment Guide for Kazakhstan, 3, (1998) 
[hereinafter OECD]. 
  
45
1994 Foreign Investment Law and the 1997 Supplementary Law  
 
     The positive spirit of the intention and readiness to attract foreign investments 
launched in the first law on foreign investments was transformed into the next law on 
foreign investment, which was adopted on December 27, 1994.262   The reason that the 
new investment law was introduced was that the 1990 foreign investment law (FIL) was 
introduced when Kazakhstan was still a part of the Soviet Union. In addition, the 1990 
FIL was drafted in Moscow, and in 1994, in order to show the independence from its 
northern neighbor; the Parliament of Kazakhstan adopted a new investment law which 
was solely the law of a new state.263 The 1994 FIL continued to encourage foreign direct 
investment by offering the same “tax holidays” as in the predecessor law. What was new 
was the additional measure of protection of investors against negative changes in 
legislation. The law states that in cases where the changes in legislation would be 
detrimental to the foreign investor, the legislation which existed when the contract was 
signed would cover the investor for ten years, and in respect to the long term contracts 
(more than ten years), changes in the law will not negatively impact the contract for the 
whole duration of the contract.264 And in cases where the changes in the legislation 
improve the starting situation of the foreign investor the contract may be changed by 
mutual agreement between the investor and the state representatives.265 Another 
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improved feature of the 1994 FIL was a new framework for the settlement of 
investment disputes:  
Where possible, investment disputes are to be resolved by negotiation. If 
no settlement has been reached by negotiation after a period of three 
months, any of the  parties involved may refer the investment dispute 
(subject to the written agreement of the foreign investor) to a court in 
Kazakhstan or (in the event that such a dispute resolution procedure has 
been previously agreed) to any one of the following arbitration authorities: 
- The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the 
“ICSID”), provided the foreign investor’s government is a signatory to the 
same. 
- The Additional Facility of the ICSID (functioning according to the Rules 
of the Additional Facility) if the investor’s government is not a signatory 
to the ICSID Convention. 
- Arbitration authorities established in accordance with the Arbitration 
Regulations of the Commission of the United Nations Organization for 
International Trade Law. 
- The Arbitration Institute of the Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm. 
- The Arbitration Commission of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
When one of the listed authorities is specified, the consent of the Republic 
is given automatically.266  
 
     Three years later a new law supplementary to the 1994 FIL was adopted. The new 
document was called “The Law on State Support of Direct Investments” and it was the 
result of pressure placed on the Kazakhstan government by the international financial 
organizations which held out large loans as an incentive for adopting this supplementary 
law.267 An important part of this law was the creation of a State Committee on 
Investments. Due to this Committee on Investments, one third of the federal ministries 
and government agencies were eliminated and a Committee was “given sole 
responsibility for carrying out government policies with respect to direct foreign 
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investment.”268 The importance of this “move” lay in “placing all decision-making 
capacity for foreign investment in one agency,” thus simplifying the process of licensing 
and registration of the foreign investor.269 The government declared that the purpose of 
this law was: 
1. Introduction of new technologies and know-how 
2. Filling the domestic market with high quality goods and services 
3. State support and stimulation of domestic producers 
4. The development of import substitute industries 
5. Rational and complex utilization of mineral resources of the country 
6. The introduction of modern way of management and marketing  
7. The creation of new jobs 
8. The introduction of the system of nonalienating training of the local work force 
and raising their qualification 
9. The intensification of production 
10. The improvement of environmental situation 270 
 
     This law not only confirmed the existing tax and custom incentives but considerably 
reduced the control of the state representatives in terms of free transfer of capital; the 
state obligated itself not to create monopolies controlling the sales of mineral resources; 
and the state also refused to regulate prices in sales or mineral resources, the state gave 
permission to foreign investors to open bank accounts in national currency and exchange 
into hard currency and vice versa.271 The 1997 law was drafted “by a small group of 
foreign advisors, and was modeled on laws that had been transplanted into Southeast 
Asia. Those laws, in turn, had been modeled on Western laws.”272  This law also defined 
priorities for foreign investments: “Designated priority sectors exclude the energy sector, 
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which the government rightly judges does not need special incentives to attract foreign 
investment. The designated sectors cover infrastructure, light industry, agriculture, 
housing, social investment in heath and education”273 This section on Kazakhstan 
explores the laws directly related to foreign investments. Beside these laws, since the 
beginning of independence a plethora of other laws and decrees were adopted in Republic 
of Kazakhstan. The legal side of the activity of the state at the beginning of its 
independence was one of the reasons that: 
Kazakhstan has achieved significant progress in transforming itself from a 
centrally planned to an open market economy. The process has been 
painful: the gross domestic product of the country almost halved between 
1991 and 1995. But the country’s natural resources and the structural 
reforms which have been put in place have attracted increasing 
commitment and growing interest form international investors.274 
 
From 1991 to 1997, Kazakhstan captured eighty percent of the total foreign direct 
investment flow designated for Central Asian republics, “It was the second most favored 
destination for FDI among former Commonwealth of Independent States after Russia. 
The cumulative value of FDI at the end of 1997 was at least US $4 billion.”275  
     As mentioned above, multiple legal documents were adopted during the time when Republic 
of Kazakhstan was “getting on its feet.” It is necessary to mention that between 1995 and 1998, 
the government undertook additional measures to create conditions for a market economy. Key 
documents included a medium-term program for further reform of the banking systems and 
programs for step-by-step transfer of social and economic organizations to local budgets, for 
developing the securities market, for promoting employment growth, for developing small and 
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medium businesses, for supporting entrepreneurial activity and for privatizing entities 
in state ownership. All these measures not only created an attractive climate for foreign 
investment but also promoted economic growth of the country. The GDP growth rate in 
Kazakhstan in 2001 was 13.2%, in 2002 it was 9.5%, in 2003-9.2%, and in 2004-9.1%.276 It is 
also easy to see that in trade Kazakhstan exported primarily: oil products (65%), base metals 
(20%), food and agriculture goods (6%) and chemicals (4%). The total compounded figure in 
monetary equivalent is $18.47 billion.277 Kazakhstan also managed to maintain a stable monetary 
policy; the inflation rate did not exceed 6. 6% in 2001-02, and the republic’s strong 
macroeconomic performance allowed repayment of all of its debt to the International Monetary 
Fund seven years ahead of schedule.278 And in March 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
graduated Kazakhstan to market economy status under U.S. trade law.279 In respect of foreign 
investments and Kazakhstan it would be impossible not to mention the role of the United States 
in the recent history of Kazakhstan. In December 1991 the United States was the first country to 
recognize Kazakhstan’s independence and it opened its embassy in the capital of Kazakhstan in 
January 1992.280  Economic cooperation between these two countries can be rated as successful 
since in 2004: “36.9% of total foreign investment in Kazakhstan came from the United States. 
American companies have invested more than $6 billion in Kazakhstan since 1993. These 
companies are concentrated in the oil and gas, business services, telecommunications, and 
electrical energy sectors.”281 The Bilateral Investment Treaty between Kazakhstan and the 
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United States was signed in 1992.282 Article II lists obligation of the parties towards 
mutual investments:  
On a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of 
nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the most 
favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain 
exceptions falling within one of the sectors of matters listed in the Annex 
to this Treaty.283 
 
In this agreement we can see the features of “equal treatment” and “most favored nation” 
status which are listed in Articles of GATT and Articles of WTO.284 Article II also 
mentions exceptions listed in the annex of this agreement, which ensure national 
treatment in the sectors or matters it has indicated below.285  The “American” list of 
exceptions is represented by a broad scope of business activities such as air-
transportation, ocean and coastal shipping, banking insurance, broadcasting etc.286 The 
list of activities granted national treatment will give Kazakhstan grounds for selected 
limitations it can employ in its further legal activity connected with investments. This 
agreement as a whole offers boon conditions and expresses an overly positive attitude 
towards foreign investment, in that it excludes performance requirements, and includes 
the opportunity to select top managerial personnel regardless of nationality, the free 
transfer of capital and much more.287 Detailed attention to this document would reach 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is relevant to mention that dispute resolution may 
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involve international arbitration organizations such as: The International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNICTRAL) or “any other arbitration rules, as may be 
mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute.”288 This bilateral agreement not only 
responded to the demands of developed countries for international investments, but its 
legacy influenced 1994 FIL.289 The U.S. friendly and helpful attitude towards newly 
independent states played a positive role in turning Kazakhstan into a country with a 
market economy. The United States of America between 1992 and 2005 “provided 
roughly $1.205 billion in technical assistance and investment support in Kazakhstan. The 
programs were designed to promote market reform, to establish a foundation for an open, 
prosperous, and democratic society, and to address security issues.”290  
 
2003 Investment Law  
 
     The most recent law on investment was adopted in 2003 and was called the “Law of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan on Investments.”291 The content of this law gives the reader 
the impression that Kazakhstan’s leadership is confident in the country’s stable and safe 
economic position and thus is more demanding and selective in its attitude towards 
investments. This law is more restrictive in relation to incentives than previous laws. For 
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instance, we can see that in respect to customs dues this law considerably limits 
preferences. We can see that in the Soviet-era 1990 FIL and in 1994 FIL equipment and 
personal items of foreign investors were not subject to custom dues. In the 2003 
investment law the conditions for custom exemption look different. Article 17 of the 
2003 FIL states:  
Exemptions from customs duties may be granted with respect to imported 
equipment in the following cases: 
1) unavailability on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 
manufacture of similar equipment and components thereof; 
2) insufficient manufacture of similar equipment and components thereof on 
the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan in order to  carry out activities 
with respect to the investment project; 
3) nonconformity of similar equipment and components thereof 
manufactured on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the 
requirements pertinent to such project.292  
 
And even if exemptions were granted, they would have a time limit of one year with 
“possible extension of such term, but not for the term exceeding five years from the 
moment of the contract’s registration.”293  
     The previous law on investment stated in the section (articles) devoted to 
nationalization that “[t]he nationalization of the property of enterprises with foreign 
participation will not be permitted, though this protection was “immediately undercut by 
a proviso permitting in exceptional circumstances requisition of investors’ property in 
accordance with the procedure established by law.”294 Still, the previous law stressed the 
inviolability of investments and placed this sentence at the beginning while underlining 
the use of requisition as an exceptional action. In the 2003 law, Article 8 begins from: 
                                                 
292 Id. Article 17. 
293 Id. 
294 Gordon Elliot, Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, Foreign Investment & Oil, 53 La. L. Rev. 1243, 1244 (1993). 
  
53
“involuntary taking of the property of an investor (nationalization, requisition) for the 
state needs shall be allowed in the exceptional cases which are provided by legislative 
acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan”295 In 1994 investment law compensation due to 
nationalization was provided in a manner similar to what is known as the Hull Formula, 
which asserts that: “taking of alien property requires the payment of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.”296 The wording was very close: “The payment is carried out 
in a manner of immediate, adequate and effective compensation.”297 In the 2003 
investment law, the requisition of the property of the investor “shall be carried out 
together with payment of the market value of the property. The market value of the 
property shall be determined in accordance with established legislation of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.”298 And if the investor does not agree with the reimbursement, “the 
valuation of the requisitioned property may be challenged in court.”299 Settlement of 
disputes is resolved in the same manner as in previous investment law involving the 
courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan and “as well as by means of international arbitration 
agreed by the parties.”300 There is an additional proviso which stipulates that “[d]isputes, 
which do not pertain to the category of investment disputes, shall be resolved in 
accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”301 
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     In addition, Chapter 2, Article 4 provides a list of guarantees of legal protection of 
investor’s activity in Kazakhstan where “[a]n investor shall be entitled to the full and 
unconditional protection of the rights and interests... backed by the Constitution.”302 In 
the case where the investor will be damaged by the incorrect holding of the state body, he 
will have the right to be reimbursed.303 But the guarantees shall not apply to:  
changes in the Legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan and/or coming 
into force of, and/or changes to the international treaties of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, which change the procedure and conditions of import, 
manufacture, sale of the excisable goods; changes and supplements which 
are introduced to the legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 
order to provide for national and ecological security, healthcare and 
morality.304 
 
In this respect the 2003 investment law drops the conditions stipulated in 1994 FIL about 
the detrimental character of the legal changes towards investors where “the legislation 
which was current at the time the investment was made will apply for the period of ten 
years, or, in the case of a long- term contract with an authorized state body, until the 
expiration of that contract.”305  
     The general attitude toward tax and custom preferences is expressed in Article 14 of 
the investment law of 2003. The idea is to take an individual approach to every 
investment contract in the priority type of activity: “Investment preferences shall be 
granted within the priority types of activity, the list of which is approved by the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan at the level of the classificatory of activity 
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subtypes.”306 The government of the republic is now more selective about the size of 
investment and its duration: “The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall 
approve maximum investment volumes and duration of investment tax preferences for 
each priority type of activity, under which the authorized body shall grant investment 
preferences.”307 The adoption of this law confirms that the situation regarding 
investments in Kazakhstan is stable. By means of this law the government of Kazakhstan 
is trying to attract not only foreign investors but domestic investors as well. The title of 
the 2003 investment law does not bear the word “foreign”, which means that conditions 
framed there refer both to foreign and domestic investors. Defining the investor in the 
2003 investment law, Article 1 states that investors are “individuals and legal entities, 
which carry out the investments in the Republic of Kazakhstan.”308 The definition of 
legal “entity” includes “any legal entity with foreign participation, incorporated in 
accordance with the procedure established by the legislation of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.”309 
     The process of attracting foreign investments took place in a time of unprecedented 
large-scale privatization of state property, during which “[s]tate property was transferred 
to its new owners by auctions, tenders, or directly to employees at no cost, or for a 
nominal charge.”310 As a result “[p]rivatization in Kazakhstan changed the system of the 
national economy. It was an engine of institutional, legislative, organizational, and social 
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change” and “Kazakhstan has developed completely new legislation and created new 
institutions.”311 Thus, through privatization, a new class of domestic owners appeared, 
and the 2003 investment law considered them as active participants in a market economy 
of modern Kazakhstan.  
     The law of Kazakhstan has made significant progress towards providing a stable legal 
environment for foreign investment since independence. As a result, legislation aimed at 
promoting investment. Multiple reforms have “drawn upon the experience of more 
established capitalist economies and implemented many suggestions from international 
advisers. And today Kazakhstan is firmly in the vanguard of former Soviet Union 
republics in adapting its legal structure to meet the needs of mixed economy.”312 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 
     This thesis discusses two examples of third world countries and their relationship with 
foreign direct investment. This thesis shows that foreign investment can have an 
important impact on the socioeconomic development of these countries. The analysis of 
this thesis was devoted to the developing countries. It is a fact that out of 100% of foreign 
direct investment only around 25% is designated for third world countries; ”European 
Union nations, the United States, and Japan accounted for more than seventy percent of 
world inflows.”313 Foreign direct investment “tends to originate from a few developed 
market economies and go to a few developed countries”, and “current statistics show that 
MNEs tend to locate their foreign operations in the richer of the richest and in the richer 
of the poorest countries of the world.”314 The biggest share of FDI comes from a small 
number of industrialized countries; “The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Japan, Switzerland, and France-account for more than eighty percent of the total global 
stock of FDI.”315 The decision of multinational corporations to allocate direct investments 
is dictated by “various economic stimuli, costs, government attitude, and geopolitical 
considerations.”316 As demonstrated above, multinational corporations prefer to invest in 
developed countries, but they also choose to invest in developing countries. This is often 
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determined by resources such as oil and gas. Other motivations to invest in developing 
countries are that “the market may be too big to ignore, as in China and Indonesia.”317  
     Almost all reading material written about the relationship between Mexico and foreign 
direct investment characterizes it as a “love-hate” relationship, because of country’s very 
contradictory approaches to this topic. In the case of Mexico, there are many reasons that 
this country is attractive for foreign investment. First of all, is Mexico’s geographic 
location--the country has access to the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Mexico is a neighbor 
of the United States which makes this country an unavoidable destination for FDI. The 
abundance of natural resources, especially oil and gas, has always made Mexico an 
attractive target for foreign investments and the importance of this feature has 
dramatically increased in recent years.318 A mild, warm climate and cheap labor, and a 
relatively developed infrastructure guarantee this country constant interest from 
multinational corporations. The analysis of Mexico in this thesis shows that Mexico 
throughout most of the twentieth century, willfully tried to avoid foreign influence and at 
all costs tried to stick to its own independent policy. For more than seventy years this 
isolationist policy yielded positive results, known by the name of “Mexican economic 
miracle,” the period from the1930s to almost the mid-1970s during which this country 
had stable (not less than 6%) annual economic growth. There are many reasons which 
contributed to the deep economic crises in the early 1980s, but the most important, in my 
opinion, is inequality in income distribution. A low education level takes second place in 
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contributing to Mexico’s socioeconomic maladies. Unfortunately, the ruling class of 
Mexico failed to deliver social justice and relative equality, thus failing to balance market 
economy and social issues. Whether foreign direct investment is a “life saver” for Mexico 
in the recent times of crisis is a disputable question. The World Bank regards FDI and 
import of technology as “the second benefit” for the countries after financial investments. 
It summarizes that: 
the ability of countries to benefit from FDI in this and or other ways is 
country and industry specific. It appears to depend on a country’s 
‘absorptive’ capacity which grows strongly with better education. The 
poorest countries have the least absorptive capacity and are most likely to 
suffer the social and environmental dangers which come with FDI.319 
 
     It is difficult to argue with the opinion that “a certain threshold of development needs 
to be reached before liberalization becomes beneficial.”320 Mexico tried to handle foreign 
direct investment to its advantage when it adopted its first foreign investment law in 
1973, and in spite its restrictive character, the investments continued to flow into the 
country. One of the internal reasons that brought Mexico into a deep financial crisis in 
spite of an abundant cash flow due to oil sales is that the Mexican government borrowed 
excessively from Western financial institutions “to address long-standing economic and 
social problems” after which the country ended up in a helpless situation when it could 
not service the international debts.321 It took another twenty turbulent years before 
Mexico adopted a laissez-faire investment law in 1993 and entered NAFTA with the 
great hope that a liberalized economy and free trade would yield results in a not too 
distant future. Many advocates of the liberal economy insist that due to NAFTA 
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agreement, trade with U.S. and Canada has tripled, and beyond this agreement, Mexico 
has twelve free trade agreements with more than forty countries including the European 
Free Trade Area and Japan, thus putting ninety percent of trade under free trade 
agreements.322  Nevertheless reducing poverty and international competitiveness continue 
to be main goals of each new government, including a new one which will take over 
power in December 2006.323  
     As for Kazakhstan, the attitude of this country to FDI was very different from that of 
Mexico. When Kazakhstan became independent, it lost almost all economic ties with 
other former Soviet Union republics. Like other broken pieces of the USSR, it 
desperately looked for international economic partners and financial resources. Both soon 
were found, thanks to an abundance of mineral resources.324 During the transition period, 
Kazakhstan managed to maintain its economic and financial stability, and recently could 
afford to implement a selective policy towards foreign investments. Today, economic 
performance in terms of GDP growth looks very impressive. Unfortunately, in spite of 
impressive economic growth figures, the population dramatically split into “haves” and 
“have-nots.” Social services like health care and education experienced a sharp decline in 
comparison with the Soviet era. Life expectancy decreased from an average 72 years to 
64.325   During its short modern history, independent Kazakhstan was and is successful in 
its policy of attracting FDI, but to being successful in attracting FDI and foreign 
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assistance is not the only prerequisite to achieving sustainable growth. Sustainable 
development can not be reached without complex, well thought out, socially-oriented 
policies regarding, for example, education and healthcare. FDI is only one part that, with 
the right proportion of regulations and incentives, can add to the general growth on the 
county’s wealth. Obviously when governments try to work out the policies to attract FDI, 
they should have in mind that foreign investors make specific contributions to economic 
development, but also that FDI policy should not disturb national objectives or patterns of  
development.326 The criteria for evaluation of FDI should include the following 
imperatives, and these imperatives are taken from “official proclamations and views 
expressed in several countries.”327 Foreign direct investment must: 
1) complement national investment and make a significant contribution to 
economic development, especially in raising living standards; 
2) not displace national investors or enter into sectors adequately supplied by 
national companies; 
3) create positive-balance-of-payments effects, adding to the capital inflows 
of the country, generating net increases in exports, and reducing 
expenditures for imports; 
4) increase employment at all levels and diversify employment opportunities, 
especially in the technical and administrative fields; train both technicians 
and managers; 
5) develop local resources and use local suppliers; 
6) stimulate activity in depressed regions; 
7) not increase monopolistic tendencies on the market; 
8) not cause a drain of local financial resources away from national investors; 
9) contribute significantly to local R&D efforts, both through a transfer of 
appropriate technology and the building of a base for indigenous scientific 
and technical research; 
10) demonstrate “good corporate citizenship” and not disturb the social and 
cultural values of the host country; 
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11)  assist local entrepreneurs in increasing their share of ownership and 
management of industry.328   
 
     If it is possible to apply these conditions to the situation in Kazakhstan, it is 
possible to say that at least half of the conditions are met by foreign investors, but 
mostly in the oil and gas sectors. The absence of the investors’ interest in other 
economic sectors such as production and agriculture, can be explained by the 
location of Kazakhstan--it is a landlocked country with two powerful neighbors--
Russia in the North and China in the South. These two countries with their 
immense territories make the transportation of Kazakhstan exports very 
expensive. A notion that the population is small can also play a negative role in 
attracting foreign investors who may not see a potential for a consumer market.329 
One of the positive Soviet legacies is the high rate of literacy in this young 
country, and this factor can contribute to the decision of the investors, where they 
needed educated working class. But, at the same time, the people of Kazakhstan, 
as former Soviet citizens, still regard free health care and education as natural 
elements of civilized life, and this can be a stumbling block for foreign investors, 
who may regard Kazakhstan as a developing country with cheap labor. The fact 
that Kazakhstan has no problems with foreign direct investments in the oil and 
gas sectors in not a ground for optimism, as “a sudden inflow of dollar-
denominated revenues often leads to a sharp appreciation in the domestic 
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currency. That tends to make non-profit sectors like agriculture and manufacturing less 
competitive in world markets, thus leaving oil to dominate the economy.” 330 The 
instability of oil prices hurts the poor the most because they are the least able to 
hedge their risks, and because this resource is concentrated, the wealth comes 
only into a few hands and “so is more susceptible to misdirection.”331 Kazakhstan 
has had impressive GDP growth for the last few years but according to the United 
Nations Human Development Index, the country ranks 78th out of 177.332  
     The analysis of the investment laws in Kazakhstan shows that they contain all 
kinds of incentives which are able to attract the most demanding investors, but the 
distant location of the country, its small population and the absence of 
international waterways harm Kazakhstan’s investment image. There’s one more 
reason which can outweigh a lot of positive efforts applied to “lure” FDI into 
Kazakhstan. It is corruption. According to a 2002 report of the organization 
Transparency International, Kazakhstan kept its 88th place ranking out of 102 in 
country corruption.333 Mexico in the same table looks better, but not much, 
maintaining 53rd place.334  
     In contrast to Kazakhstan, Mexico is not disadvantaged in regard to geographic 
location and population size. Mexico has everything necessary to become a 
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wealthy, competitive, and successful state: good location, abundance of resources, big 
population. Its foreign investment flow is one of the highest in Latin America, and 
if we look at figures such as GDP growth, oil and gas sales, and export and import 
rates, they would look very impressive and today Mexico has the ninth largest 
economy in the world. Yet, we also can see that demands listed in the United 
Nations Human Development Index are far from satisfactory in the areas such as 
education, income per capita, health care and everything that relates to decent 
conditions for human life. And this is probably one of the main reasons why so 
many Mexican people try to emigrate to the United States of America.  
     Foreign direct investment can benefit the country’s socioeconomic 
development only in the case where the leadership of the country willfully and 
consequently pursues the goal of turning its developing country into a developed 
country through democratic instruments promoting fair and just distribution of 
wealth. 
     When the leadership of any country is trying hard to attract FDI, it must not 
forget that the main sources of this type of investment are multinational 
corporations, and corporations are created with the sole purpose, of making profit 
for their shareholders. So, when corporations invest in a country they do it with 
the purpose of making profit and this purpose may reflect both long and short- 
term economic interest. Sometimes, when after attracting the desired amount of 
FDI, the country finds itself not only without anticipated gains, but even worse off 
than it was before FDI inflow. This might mean that the government did not 
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assess properly the future impact of such a decision and in some cases was excessively 
optimistic or trustful when getting FDI on stipulated terms and conditions. It is 
crucial to remember that “[s]ome TNCs (transnational corporations) may be 
considerably more powerful than the regulating host state. Many of the TNCs 
based in the USA or United Kingdom are driven by the concept of maximizing 
shareholder value.”335 Moreover, when attracting FDI, the host country should not 
be “lulled” by the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in which 
“ethical, environmental and other public policy commitments are treated 
explicitly”, since this document is not legally binding.336  
 Foreign investments add positive impact to the national economy when the 
leaders of the county apply all their efforts to build a society of educated, affluent, 
and law-abiding citizens who know their rights and obligations.      
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